Democratizing Democracy

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
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People are losing faith in democracy

On the slide

The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index Global average of 167 countries, 10=most democratic



The Economist

Reasons for this: 3 Cs

 Clientelism politics of patronage, exchange of goods and services with a sub-group for political support. Can results in an emphasis on private goods over public goods.

Corruption

- a) High cost of elections results in theft of public funds to fund elections
- b) Using political office as a means for private gain
- Capture Control of the electoral, and governmental, process by elites and special interests.

Overwhelming evidence, around the world, for each of these

How Do We Make
Democracy
More
Democratic?

I will focus on four themes (there are many more) drawing on my work in India:

- Deliberation
- Incentivizing Politicians
- Democratizing Data
- Added Value of Local Democracy

Deliberative Democracy

Aggregation of Preferences vs. Consensual Transformation of Preferences

Indian gram sabhas

- Largest deliberative body in human history
- 2 million villages
- Over 800 million people
- 73rd Amendment Requires at least 2 a year



Oral Democracy

Vijayendra Rao and Paromita Sanyal, Cambridge University Press, 2019 (Free Open Access)

Panchayat Policies in South India (2004)

Kerala - High Quality

- People's campaign
- Nested planning "seminars"
- Match between plans and funds
- Widely lauded
- •Panchayats have 40% of the state budget
- •Almost 100% literacy

Karnataka - Medium Quality

- Panchayat pioneers
- Gives gram sabha powers over public funds and private benefits
- Parliamentary style selection of president
- •Strong differences between north and south

Tamil Nadu – Medium Quality


- More interventionist state
- •Gram Panchayat petitions officials as the "union" level for budget
- •Role of self-help groups
- •Used for information dissemination
- •Incentives for better performance
- •Direct election for president

Andhra Pradesh - Low Quality

- Technocratic
- •Top-down
- Hauled to supreme court for not holding elections

Data and Methodology

- 298 Gram Sabhas recorded between 2003-2004
- Transcribed and translated from four South Indian languages
- Natural Experiment
- Role of Literacy
- Focus on discourse equality of agency



South Indian states at Independence - 1947

- Madras Presidency
- Hyderabad
- Mysore
- Bombay Presidency
- Travancore
- Cochin

Re-organization of states along linguistic lines – 1956

- Andhra Pradesh (Telugu)
- Karnataka (Kannada)
- Tamil Nadu (Tamil)
- Kerala (Malayalam)

District Comparisons

- Bidar (Karnataka) / Medak (AP)
- Chithoor (AP)/Dharmapuri (Tamil Nadu)
- Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu) / Palakkad (Kerala)
- Dakshina Kanada (Karnataka)/Kasaragod (Kerala)

Key Findings

LOW CAPACITY MEDIUM CAPACITY HIGH CAPACITY

CHITHOOR (AP)

State: Complaint collector

Citizens: Passive petitioners

MEDAK (AP)

State: Complaint collector

Citizens: Passive petitioners

DHARMAPURI (TN)

State: Social reformer

Citizens: Civic deliberators

BIDAR (KA)

State: Scrutinizer

Citizens: Elite stewards &

Rude citizens

COIMBATORE (TN)

State: Social reformer

Citizens: Militant deliberators

DAKSHINA KANADA (KA)

State: Informant

Citizens: Pragmatic deliberators

PALAKKAD (KL)

State: Planner

Citizens: Benefit invigilators

KASARGOD (KL)

State: Planner

Citizens: Benefit invigilators

And...

- Literacy has little effect on the quality of deliberation
- Having a gram sabha reduces misallocation and corruption (Besley, Pande & Rao 2005)
- Gram sabhas represent the preferences of the median voter (hence are not dominated by elites) (Ban, Jha & Rao, 2012)



Reference: Ghazala Mansuri, Nethra Palaniswamy, Vijayendra Rao, Slesh A. Shrestha, "Money versus Kudos: The impact of incentivizing local politicians in India," *Journal of Public Economics*, August 2023

Key Elements

- Public incentives with independent citizen-based performance monitoring
- Compares Monetary Incentives ("Money) for public goods with providing a Certificate of good performance ("Kudos")

Treatment

In April 2015, all Village Panchayat Presidents received an official letter

<u>In control VPs</u>: Letter said that they would be evaluated as usual on the basis of broad criteria like better targeting of transfers and equitable delivery of public goods, and assigned grades A, B or C. No incentives provided

<u>In Treatment VPs</u>: Letter added a statement about the incentives associated with grades A, B or C. Otherwise the letters were identical

Independent Scoring of Performance is Key for Legitimacy

- Committees formed of Members of VPRC to monitor performance of VPs in other districts
- Objective scoring criteria on performance of VP functions
- All monitoring data goes through a 3-step validation process
 - Locally validated through a Social Audit Committee (SAC)
 - Every month data is reviewed by project functionaries, as part of the block, and state reviews
 - ► Third-party monitoring firm review the data and reports
 - ► Financial statements were audited by Pricewaterhouse Coopers on an annual basis

Incentive Arms in Treatment (2014)

Monetary Incentive

- Reward VP Presidents with a cash grant that can be used for public investments at the presidents discretion
 - Grade A Receives Rs 600,000
 - Grade B Receives Rs 300,000
- Cost of village road ≈ Rs 600,000, village well ≈Rs 200,000, road ≈100,000

Information treatment

- Advertised the achievement of high performing GP presidents to their constituents
- For each GP president who receive A or B grade,
 - Special Gram Sabha (village meeting) would be organized during which
 - President's effort was acknowledged
 - Grade announced by the VPRC
 - President would be presented with the certificate of recognition from the State Government
- In addition, for grade A presidents,
 - · An information campaign that highlighted his/her achievement was organized
 - A large poster (of size 23.4 x 33.1 inches)—comparable to a large political advertisement board—was put in the main GP square
 - 100 posters (of size 11.7 x 16.5 inches) of similar design was given to the president to put up in the GP or distribute

Experiment



▶ President of [District Name] [Block Name] [Panchayat Name] is commended for excellent performance in her/his functions related to the PVP program, and in facilitating access to the program benefits for the poor, vulnerable and others in the village.

Incentivizing Politicians Resulted In

- Increase in access to private transfers
- Increase in access to public goods
 - More hamlets received new public investments (and IAY scheme)
- No difference between financial and nonfinancial incentives
- Decrease in corruption/nepotism
- Reduced Clientelism movement away from VP President's hamlet and from his caste

For a little dated but excellent policy overview see the UNCDF Report on Performance-Based Grant Systems, 2010



Democratizing Data Participatory Tracking in Tamil Nadu*



Step 1: Develop Questionnaire

- Community Based
- Uses women's networks
- Tested by community members with community members
- Finalized questionnaire should take no more that 30 minutes



What makes this questionnaire different?

Overlap in themes covered

■ NSS: 17 %

LSMS type survey: 70 %

- Covered a range of themes:
 - Well-being, Livelihoods, Economic Welfare, Food Security and Nutrition, Empowerment, Access to public services and programs, Political Participation
- Differed in framing and emphasis



A sample of questions

Food and Nutrition

How much do you spend on the purchase of vegetables in a month?

Does the person who eats last get enough to eat?

Marriage

What was your age at the time of your marriage?

Was your decision taken into account at the time of your marriage?

Did you marry your relative?

Empowerment

Who makes decisions on assets and loans in your family?

Do you decide on what clothes to wear based on your own preferences?

Have there been any instances of violence against women in your village?

Digital Participation

Can you use a mobile phone on your own?

Can you read and send text messages?




Step 2: Data collection and management

- Participatory
 - Implemented and managed by CBO members
 - PVP project staff- Coordinating role
- Other Key features
 - Tablet based
 - Data Quality and Validation
 - Designed for users with low digital literacy



Step 3: Data visualization

☐ Empower respondents to analyze and act on their own data





Origin

- Give Citizens the ability to collect and analyze their own data
- Census of program participants
 - Pilot of 32000 households in one district (Theni)
 - Pilot conducted in 2013-14



Pilot PVP: Data visualization



Who has the dominant voice in household decisions? Dominant parties are represented with larger faces.

	Agamalai - Tribal	H9 Manalathukudusai
Is your opinion accepted related to your child's education and marriage?		
Who makes the decisions regarding your clothing?		
Who makes the decisions regarding the number of children?		
Who makes the decisions regarding when to visit your parents house?		



Pilot PVP: Data visualization



The change in assets of families in the village are shown. Green items have been gained in the last five years. Red items have been lost. Unshaded items were in possession both five years ago and now. Click to see different families.







Pilot PVP: Data visualization

Flowers and marriage

Each flower depicts a bundle of indicators pertaining to marriage. One flower reprents one married woman. The height of the flower corresponds to the age at marriage where shorter flowers are women that got married at younger ages. The color of the flower represents whether the marriage was with a blood relative (red) or not (yellow). The type of flower represents whether the woman gave consent (bloomed) to being married or not (unbloomed). The number of leaves represent the number of children in marriage. Click to see different women in the area.

This visualization may be used to see relationships in the data. For instance, are there many short, unbloomed flowers? Are red flowers usually consensual or not? Does consensuality increase or decrease with age?






Diet and nutrition



The diet of families from the village are shown. The size of food items on the plate indicate the frequencies at which people consume vegetables, meat, and fruit -- larger items are consumed more frequently. Colored rupees indicate how much money was spent on each type of food. An empty banana leaf indicates that the last person did not have enough to eat. Click to different families.





Step 4: Data Feedback









Elected leaders OR Appointed Administrators?

Reference: Abhishek Arora, Siddharth George, Vijayendra Rao and MR Sharan, "The Added Value of Local Democracy: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WPS 10555, August 2023

- Important question across history: debated since Ancient Greece
- Strikes at the heart of the value of democracy
- Intrinsic value is undeniable:
 - Political and social participation has intrinsic value
- But what is the instrumental value of democracy?
 - How does having elected leaders change material well-being of citizens?
- Empirically hard to answer
 - Cross-country studies are inconclusive


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
- We study elected vs appointed leaders
- In Karnataka
- Using covid-induced postponement of elections in GPs in 2020
 - Most GPs transitioned to appointed administrators
 - Some continued to have elected leaders
 - This allows us to empirically examine the value of local democracy



Simultaneously, elected officials and bureaucrats headed Panchayats in Karnataka: Allows to compare elected/non-elected in the same Taluk

Elected Gram Panchayats in a Taluk (Sub-District) DAVANAGERE






Simultaneously, elected and administrators headed Panchayats in


Karnataka

Allowing us to compare elected and appointment leadership in the same taluk


Elected Gram Panchayats in a Taluk



Citizen better represented in elected panchayats



Understanding citizens' economic needs: MNREGA during covid



Some Implications for Nepal

- LOCAL DEMOCRACY IS BETTER THAN RULE BY BUREAUCRATS.
- Takes time to mature. Be Patient, but work to make it better.
- Essential to Deal with Climate Resilience.
- Technical Decisions Should Be Left To Technical Experts
- Create Credible Rating System of Municipal Government Performance
- Citizen Generated Data with Report Cards (Our work in Dhankuta and Itahari)
- External Scoring by Independent Committees
- Use these Scores to Incentivize Local Government Officials
- Higher Salaries, More Budget, Kudos (Certificates, Awards).
- Low-Cost and High Return
- But scoring system must be credible
- Empower Tole Development Organizations (TDO/TDC) and Ward Committee Meetings: Decisions have to be based on Nested, Participatory Planning and Monitoring (Exist on Paper but not in practice)
- Dhankuta/Itahari Work