Ethnic Bias, Migration, and the Formation of New Social Identities among Returnees in Nepal

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Social Science Baha Lecture Series

10 April 2024

Temporary International Migration

- Temporary migration has risen in prominence, taking a dominant role in global international migration
    - Temporary migrants outnumber permanent migrants in all categories combined in OECD countries
    - >25 million workers from South Asia employed as temporary migrant workers abroad

- Positive impacts due to immediate benefits from increased earnings

- Does the limited time spent abroad by migrants benefit them and their communities after they return?
    - Knowledge acquired: job creation, economic recovery [Dustmann and Kirchamp, 2002; Bahar et al., 2019]
    - Changes in political preferences: demand for accountability and better governance [Spilimbergo, 2009; Batista and Vicente, 2011]
    - Impacts on economic preferences and decision-making in lab settings [Gibson et al., 2019]

Migration and Social Identity

- Effects extend beyond mere financial gains, as migrants' experiences abroad shape their preferences and decisions long after their return

- Does migration also affect social preferences that determine how they interact with individuals from a different group than their own?

  - And, whether their migration experience can be leveraged to overcome preexisting social divisions prevalent in the origin country?

- Among immigrants in the US, their social identity associated with their home country affect their labor market outcomes [Casey and Dustmann, 2010]

- In many other types of settings, individual's or group's social preferences and identities affect economic outcomes

The Economics of Social Identity

- Cross-country (and within-country analysis):
    - Ethnic diversity is associated with lower levels of public good provision [e.g. Alesina et al., 1999; Banerjee et al., 2005], higher levels of political corruption [e.g. Esteban et al., 2005], and worse economic performance [Alesina and Ferrara, 2005]
    - Differing social identities of individuals make collective action and cooperation costly

- In the laboratory setting:
    - Social identity (made salient through priming) affects contribution to public goods [Eckel and Grossman, 2005] and lending in microfinance [Chen et al., 2017]
    - Risk preference, patience, altruism, social norms, and even cognitive ability [e.g. Hoff and Pandey, 2014]

- These effects can be described through the model of social identity
    - First introduced in psychology and later adopted in economics by Akerlof and Kranton (2000)

- Different variations of social identity model:
    - Social norms – the desire to follow the actions prescribed by a group [Akerlof and Kranton, 2005]
    - Social preferences – individuals also care about the welfare of others, but they care about ingroup members more [Chen and Li, 2009]

Contribution 1

- Nepal recently emerged from a prolonged period of civil conflict that was in part rooted in and fueled by ethnic tensions

- A rise in prosocial behavior within violence-affected communities in Nepal [Gilligan et al., 2013]

- A growing body of research in post-conflict settings suggests that enhanced social cohesion stems from heightened *ingroup* bias [Bauer et al., 2016]

    - Strengthening prosociality towards one's own identity group, at the expense of the *outgroup*

- Voting patterns in the 2017 municipal election suggest a strong co-ethnic bias in voting [figure]

- In other settings, direct interventions to improve social cohesion has produced mixed results

    - Community Driven Development (CDD) [Mansuri and Rao, 2013; Ban et al., 2015]

- Social norms difficult to change even in the longer term [Alesina et al., 2013; Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2015; Sanyal et al., 2015]

- Overcoming co-ethnic bias could be one of the most significant challenge to its post-conflict transition towards reconciliation and development

Contribution 2

- Despite the popularity of temporary migration programs, evidence on the effects remains scarce

  - Two notable exceptions are Clemens and Tiongson (2017) and Mobarak et al. (2023)

  - In the short term, various restrictions imposed by these programs have shown to:

    - Create monopsony power to suppress migrant wages in the UAE [Naidu et al., 2016]

    - Increase demand volatility for Filipino migrants to global economic shocks [McKenzie et al., 2014]

    - Restrict job mobility for vulnerable migrants in Singapore [Shrestha and Yang, 2019]

- Migration viewed as one of the most effective development policies [Gibson and McKenzie, 2014]

  - Wide-range of interventions to improve the development impact of migration. Most of them focus on:

  - Improving earning prospects of aspirant and current migrants [e.g. Beam et al., 2016, Shrestha, 2020]

  - Better utilizing and managing remittance flowing into developing countries [e.g. Seshan and Yang, 2014, Ashraf et al., 2015]

- Interventions on the re-assimilation of return migrants are almost non-existent

  - Little evidence on return migrants come from returning refugees and students [Bahar et al., 2024; Spilimbergo, 2009]

  - But their migrant experience significantly different compared to temporary labor migrants

Context

- Nepal is ethnically diverse
    - 128 unique ethnicities, 123 different languages (2011 Nepal Census)
- Six broadly defined ethnic groups
    - Brahmin-Chhetri: 31.1%
    - Janajati: 23.3%
    - Madhesi (15%), Dalit (13.4%), Newar (5%), and Other minorities (13.3%)
    - [Slide example]
- We focus on the two largest ethnic groups: Brahmin-Chhetri (*BC*) and Janajati (*J*)

History of Ethnic Division and Inequality

- Brahmin-Chhetri have wielded significant administrative and political power in modern Nepal

  - Codification of ethnicity-based caste categories into the legal system in 1854

  - Continued consolidation of power even after the introduction of democracy in the 1950s

  - Nationalism based on the religious, linguistic, and cultural values of the dominant group

  - Excluding and alienating various indigenous ethnic groups as deviant from this universal national identity

  - In politics, judiciary, and bureaucracy [Lawoti and Guneratne, 2013]:

    - *B-C* group is over represented (60%, 65%, and 84% respectively), while *J* group is underrepresented (17%, 6%, and 3%)

History of Ethnic Division and Inequality

- Brahmin-Chhetri have wielded significant administrative and political power in modern Nepal

- Maoist insurgency between 1996 and 2006

- New constitution decentralized power to newly formed provincial and municipal governments, with inclusive local governance as a cornerstone of this "new" Nepal

- These reforms have improved the political representation of ethnic groups like Janajati

- In the initial municipal election held in 2017, *B-C*s were still disproportionately represented among the elected municipal chairs ($\approx$ 50%)

- Ethnic heterogeneity remains high across all newly formed municipalities

  - All 753 municipalities include both *B-C* and *J* ethnic groups [map]

  - The average size of the largest ethnic group in a municipality is 58.7%

  - In 565 (75%) municipalities, the largest ethnic group only makes up not more than 70% of its population

  - In municipalities where *B-C* or *J* ethnic group comprises of more than 50% of the population, the other group still makes up, on average, 13% of the population

- Such granular ethnic diversity can hinder collective action within the municipality

Labor Migration and Returnees

- In the last two decades, coinciding with the civil war, migration of Nepali workers outside the country has risen dramatically
    - 2001-2011: the share of migrants rose six-fold, remittance as the share of GDP increased ten-fold
    - By 2011, one in every five households had a migrant worker living abroad (outside India)

- Migrant workers who have returned to Nepal make up a sizable group
    - Return migrants are 7% of Nepal's working-age population (16% of working-age men)
    - An average age of 34 years

- They remain active members in their communities and many engage in political activities
    - Return migrant membership groups and their activities (≈20% of our subjects)
    - 38% are member of neighborhood committees, 22% members of a political party
    - 73% have attended budget discussion meetings organized by local government

Profile of Temporary Labor Migrants

- Labor permits issued by Department of Foreign Employment [table]

- Migrants are restricted to working in a few migrant-dominated sectors
  - Our subjects worked with, on average, 18 Nepali migrants in their last job abroad (> 50% from a different ethnic group than their own)

- Migrants also face strict limitations on social integration and physical mobility (e.g. family members do not accompany them, live in migrant dorms separated from natives)
  - Subjects shared room with 5 other Nepalis, on average (≈50% from a different ethnic group)
  - More than 70% lend money to other Nepali migrants (≈50% from a different ethnic group)

- Migration experience engenders substantial intermixing and interactions across ethnic lines

- This could increase social cohesion across different ethnicities
  - Shared common experience
  - Strengthen national identity

Research Questions

- We run a lab-in-the-field experiment to test:

  1. Whether subjects exhibit co-ethnic biases in their prosocial behavior?

  2. Whether their migration experience (made salient through priming) can change their prosocial behavior?

  3. Whether this migration effect can redress some of the co-ethnic biases prevalent in the status quo?

- Our main outcomes relate to the subject's prosocial behavior in the form of:
  - Altruism, cooperation, and ethnic prejudice in selecting a leader/judge (an arbiter)
  - Measured by their choices in different economic games

Theoretical Environment

- A two-agent version of the identity-dependent social preference models of Charness and Rabin (2002), Chen and Li (2009), and Shayo (2009)

- Two agents, i and j, where agent i's utility is:

$$u_i = [\alpha^{1-r} \, \pi_j^r + (1-\alpha)^{1-r} \pi_i^r]^{1/r}$$

  - π_i and π_j are agents i and j' s monetary payoffs, respectively

  - $\frac{1}{1-r}$ is the elasticity of substitution

- $r \rightarrow 0$: $u_i = \alpha \pi_j + (1-\alpha)\pi_i$

- In the Shayo (2009) model, the other-regarding preference parameter α is a function of the *social distance* d between the two agents with $\frac{\partial \alpha}{\partial \mathrm{d}} < 0$

Theoretical Environment

$$d_{ij} = \sqrt{\sum_h w^h (q_i^h - q_j^h)^2}$$

- h indexes different social groups that agents can belong to

- q_i^h and q_j^h denote the quality or attribute of agents i and j, respectively, along dimension h

- w^h denotes how much dimension h matters to agent i

- Allows for any number of $h > 0$ social groups

  - Based on demographic characteristics like gender, ethnicity, age, etc.

  - Based on preferences and experiences like vegans, return migrants, etc.

- d_{ij} changes when:

  - Attributes of the agents (q_i^h and q_j^h) change

  - Attention paid to the different dimensions, w^h, changes

Research Design

- 2 x 2 subject design

- Along one dimension ($h = ethnicity$):
  - Subject is either matched with others from his own ethnic group (*Ingroup*)
  - Or from the other ethnic group (*Outgroup*) to play several economic games

- Along the other dimension ($h = migrant$):
  - Half of subjects are *primed* to activate migrant identity prior to playing games (*Migrant*)
  - And the other half are not primed on any particular identity (*Neutral*)
  - All subjects are return migrants
    - Priming allows us to randomize
    - Study the behavior of specific identities without a selection effect, which might occur when comparing subjects in different groups (e.g. migrant versus non-migrant)

- All subjects are randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups [figure]

Priming Intervention

- Exposure to stimulus (e.g. a survey) leads to a change in behavior

- Priming can make specific social identity salient (thereby changing behavior)
    - Gender, ethnicity, religion, politics, past behavior
    - Affect outcomes like other-regarding preferences and altruism [Chen et al., 2014; Benjamin et al., 2016]

- Migrant prime
    - ≈20 minute questionnaire on subject's migration history and experience
    - Followed by 4 migration-related generic photographs + structured conversation

- Neutral prime
    - ≈20 minute questionnaire on subject's education history and school experience
    - Followed by 4 generic photographs of nature + structured conversation

Table B2: Order of Lab Activities Experienced by Subjects

	Avg. time spent (in minutes)
Panel A: Migration treatment	
1. Survey of demographic characteristics + cognitive test	12.08
2. Migration priming questions	22.66
3. Migration pictures + conversation	3.89
4. Economic game: DG	3.83
5. Economic game: PGG_NP	10.51
6. Economic game: PGG_EP	8.85
7. Economic game: PGG_AP	13.65
8. Neutral priming questions	14.54
9. Survey of political and community participation	14.75
Total interview time (Avg.)	104.54
Panel B: Neutral treatment	
1. Survey of demographic characteristics + cognitive test	12.39
2. Neutral priming questions	15.15
3. Neutral pictures + conversation	2.40
4. Economic game: DG	3.66
5. Economic game: PGG_NP	10.37
6. Economic game: PGG_EP	8.63
7. Economic game: PGG_AP	13.56
8. Migration priming questions	20.16
9. Survey of political and community participation	15.94
Total interview time (Avg.)	101.97

Notes: Panel A (B) includes subjects in IM and OM (IN and ON) treatment groups.

Economic Games

- Dictator Game [screenshots]
    - Agent i receives 200 NPR, and decides how much of that to give it to agent j
    - Non-strategic game and the amount given measures the level of altruism
        - $x^* = \alpha E$, which is increasing in α

- Public Goods Game [screenshots]
    - Agents i and j each get 200 NPR endowment, and each independently decide how much to contribute to public pot
    - Amount in the public pot is multiplied by 1.5 and redistributed equally
    - Each agent wins the amount initially kept (not contributed to pot) plus the amount redistributed
    - The amount contributed by agent i to the pot measures the level of cooperation
    - x^* is increasing in α (as well as beliefs $\bar{x}_j$ about the other player's contribution)

$$x^* = \frac{\alpha \left(\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-r}} (E + \gamma \bar{x}_j) - (1-\alpha)[E - (1-\gamma)\bar{x}_j]}{(1-\alpha)\gamma + \alpha(1-\gamma)(\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma})^{\frac{1}{1-r}}}$$

Economic Games

- Public Goods Game [examples]

  - Even when $\alpha = 0$, both agents i and j can be better off choosing $x > 0$ ($x^* = 0$)

  - For this, it requires agents i and j to coordinate and ``cooperate''

  - Suppose, you put $x_i > 0$ but the other person reneges on the promise and instead contributes $x_j = 0$, then you will be worse off than when you contributed $x = 0$

  - Does the other person have any benefit from reneging? Yes [examples]

    - This is the example of a free-riding problem. Above, agent j is free-riding off agent i

  - Nash equilibrium $= x_i^* = x_j^* = 0$

    - This is the example of ``tragedy of the commons''

  - But when $\alpha > 0$, even if the face of risk of free-riding, agents contribute $x^* > 0$

  - This also explains the findings why ethnic diversity is negatively correlated with public goods provisions, and why more homogenous society have better managed public goods

Economic Games

- Public Goods Game with Punishment [screenshots]
  - Same rule as Public Goods Game except
    - All subjects play with someone from a different ethnic group
    - If subjects contribute too little to the pot, their payoff is reduced by some amount (50 NPR)
    - Not told how much is too little, but that this punishment threshold is determined by a third party arbiter
  - Subject is allowed to choose an arbiter (2 choices)
    - Someone from the same ethnic group or from a different ethnic group

  - Theoretical predictions for the subjects arbiter choice decision are not straightforward
    - Depends on α and beliefs about what the match's contribution in different scenarios
    - Prediction figure in an example situation
    - Running a simulation (by randomly choosing α, $\bar{x}_I$, $\bar{x}_O$), for an increase in α, it is more likely that the arbiter choice will change from ingroup to outgroup than from outgroup to ingroup
      - 14% ingroup to outgroup, 3% outgroup to ingroup, 83% no change.

Subject Recruitment

- Study conducted between June and July 2022

- Subjects are male return migrants

- Study sites located across 6 Eastern districts of Nepal [figure]

- Sample size: 633 (317 Brahmin-Chhetri and 316 Janajati) [table]

- Randomization protocols and balance checks [table]

- Implementation of priming intervention [results]

- Implementation quality checks [table]

- Subject characteristics [table]

Results- Dictator Game

- Neutral treatment
  - Ingroup: 61 NPR
  - Outgroup: 49 NPR

- Baseline co-ethnic bias: 12 NPR (≈24%) (p = 0.0269)

- Migrant treatment
  - No difference between ingroup and outgroup

- Diff-in-diff estimate: 12.52 NPR (p = 0.0969)

Results- Public Goods Game

- Neutral treatment

  - Ingroup: 82 NPR

  - Outgroup: 58 NPR

- Baseline co-ethnic bias: 30 NPR ($\approx$40%)
  (p = 0.0010)

- Migrant treatment

  - No difference between ingroup and outgroup

- Diff-in-diff estimate: 27.20 NPR   (p = 0.0109)

- Beliefs about match's actions correlated with the subject's own action (r = 0.57)

Results- Arbiter Choice

- Neutral treatment
  - Ingroup arbiter: 58.6%

- Migrant treatment
  - Ingroup arbiter: 47.26%

- *P*-value of this diff. estimate= 0.0140

Additional Results- Effect of punishment

- Difference in contribution between with and without punishment (within-subject)

- In all 4 treatments, contribution is higher with (exogenous) punishment than without punishment
  - All p-values < 0.0001

- In all 4 treatments, contribution is higher with (arbiter) punishment than with exogenous punishment
  - All p-values < 0.005

Results- Summary

- In status quo, we observe co-ethnic bias in both altruistic and cooperative behavior (≈20 to 40%)

- Migrant prime eliminates ingroup bias in both strategic and non-strategic environments

- Subjects are also more willing to choose an outgroup arbiter under the Migrant treatment

- Comparing these results to our theoretical model, it suggest that social distance (and therefore α) between subjects in *OutxMig* treatment is similar to that in the *Ingroup* treatments
    - Meaning that the migrant prime successfully reduces social distance between the different ethnic groups

- Lends evidence to the idea that migrant experience can create a ``unifying'' identity that reduces ethnic tensions

- Vote patterns by migration [figure]

Results- Summary

- Punishment increases cooperation

- Type of punishment mechanism matters

    - When another person is determining whether or not subjects are punished, subjects increase their cooperation even more than when the punishment is determined exogenously

- Punishment mechanisms in the Public Goods Game can increase cooperation to the extent that ingroup bias is essentially "masked"

- Migrant priming can have similar (though weaker) effect on cooperation as punishment mechanism

Questions/comments?

Thank you!

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For the purpose of this study, we have divided all Nepali into 6 groups based on their ethnicity and caste. These 6 groups are:

- Brahmin-Chhetri
- Madhesi
- Newars
- Janajati
- Dalit
- Other minorities

Which of the above groups do you belong to?

High ethnic diversity   Low ethnic diversity

Table B1: Characteristics of Foreign Employment Permits

	2017-2019 (1)	2017 (2)	2018 (3)	2019 (4)
No. of permits issued	1,737,636	638,957	607,002	491,677
Male	94.4%	94.8%	94.6%	93.7%
Age *(in years)*	31.1	31.0	30.7	31.7
Unskilled occupation[†]	55.8%	52.2%	59.5%	56.0%
Monthly salary *(in 2017 NPR)*	45,321	56,949	38,123	39,096
Length of validity *(in years)*	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0
Source province: Province 1	23.0%	22.8%	23.0%	23.2%
Source province: Province 2	26.0%	26.7%	26.4%	24.6%
Destination country: GCC	78.6%	77.2%	74%	86%
Destination country: Malaysia	17.1%	19.4%	21.8%	8.4%

Notes: [†]Other occupation categories are: skilled, semi-skilled, high-skilled, and professional.

		Ingroup Matching (*In*)		Outgroup Matching (*Out*)	
Neutral Priming	(*Neut*)	B-C:	80	B-C:	79
		J:	79	J:	79
Migrant Priming	(*Mig*)	B-C:	79	B-C:	79
		J:	79	J:	79

Notes: Number of Brahmin-Chhetri (B-C) and Janajati (J) subjects in each treatment displayed in cells.

(a) $\overline{x_O} = 10$ (b) $\overline{x_O} = 50$ (c) $\overline{x_O} = 90$

(d) $\overline{x_O} = 110$ (e) $\overline{x_O} = 150$ (f) $\overline{x_O} = 190$

	All sample (1)	Brahmin-Chhetri only (2)	Janajati only (3)
Site 1: Jhapa district	228	112	116
Site 2: Morang district	48	28	20
Site 3: Dhankuta district	62	37	25
Site 4: Sunsari district	131	60	71
site 5: Saptari district	48	24	24
Site 6: Udayapur district	116	56	60
Total sample	633	317	316

High ethnic diversity — Low ethnic diversity

Study Areas
Site 1: Jhapa District
Site 2: Morang District
Site 3: Dhankuta District
Site 4: Sunsari District
Site 5: Saptari District
Site 6: Udayapur District

	InMig vs. OutNeut (1)	InMig vs. InNeut (2)	InMig vs. OutMig (3)	OutNeut vs. InNeut (4)	OutNuet vs. OutMig (5)	IngNeut vs. OutMig (6)
Age	0.494	0.546	0.329	0.194	0.739	0.118
Married	0.177	0.732	0.072***	0.311	0.648	0.142
Education: 5 or above	0.586	0.191	0.804	0.067***	0.429	0.287
Education: 10 or above	0.906	0.589	0.906	0.511	1.000	0.511
Score in mathematics test (out of 10)	0.419	0.153	0.334	0.533	0.886	0.625
Years since last return	0.452	0.979	0.547	0.452	0.168	0.579
Number of years abroad	0.004***	0.046**	0.014**	0.404	0.684	0.665
% Worked in GCC	0.552	0.381	0.183	0.780	0.462	0.647
% Worked in Malaysia	0.265	0.306	0.214	0.925	0.898	0.824
Numer of Nepali co-workers	0.166	0.414	0.822	0.377	0.155	0.372
% from own ethnic group	0.151	0.222	0.072***	0.875	0.725	0.620
Number of Nepali roommates	0.163	0.305	0.531	0.480	0.335	0.653
% from own ethnic group	0.547	0.386	0.249	0.807	0.591	0.759
% Lend money to Nepali migrants	0.606	0.142	0.048**	0.342	0.143	0.606
Number of Nepalis lend money to	0.030**	0.395	0.702	0.236	0.085***	0.650
% from own ethnic group	0.995	0.091***	0.130	0.095***	0.134	0.825
Injury or illness	0.903	0.367	0.342	0.435	0.284	0.064***
Borrowed money from Nepali migrants	0.726	0.762	0.490	0.513	0.298	0.698
Member of informal savings groups	0.346	0.661	0.836	0.168	0.251	0.817
Member of migrant organization	1.000	0.743	0.359	0.743	0.359	0.550
Member of return migrant associations	1.000	0.783	1.000	0.783	1.000	0.783
Member of a neighborhood committee	0.909	0.534	0.818	0.462	0.730	0.696
Member of professional associations/unions	0.911	0.953	0.501	0.957	0.575	0.539
Member of a political party	0.681	0.912	0.347	0.763	0.597	0.405
Member of an ethnic organization	0.630	0.469	0.751	0.228	0.870	0.297
Participated in return migrant programs	0.246	0.243	0.331	0.020**	0.034**	0.846
Participated in ethnic rallies	0.811	0.780	0.721	0.605	0.906	0.525
Participated in political rallies	0.299	0.515	0.086***	0.698	0.497	0.285
Participated in meetings of local government	0.376	0.777	0.804	0.546	0.524	0.972
Voted in Nepali election	0.585	0.566	0.893	0.978	0.681	0.660
SUR joint test p-value	0.146	0.563	0.436	0.569	0.409	0.900

Notes: The table reports the p-values of the t-tests of the difference in means between treatment groups. p-value at the bottom of the table shows joint significance of the coefficients in the corresponding column from SUR estimation. Significant at the *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% levels.

Natural Language Processing

- Recorded conversation between subject and enumerator during one part of the priming session
- Randomly selected 50% of the recordings from each of the 4 treatments (with each ethnic group)
- 321 recordings, with an average duration of 3.14 minutes per recording
- Unsupervised Structural Topic Model (STM) to identify a set of k = 4 topics within our transcript data

Topic	Top word stems
Nature	Highest Prob: vegetable, forest, use, went, remember, river, farm FREX: green, grass, tomato, fish, cultivate, vegetable, river
Migration-social	Highest Prob: eat, work, use, money, time, home, friend FREX: country, family, happy, festival, earn, abroad, foreign
School	Highest Prob: remember, school, look, use, play, time, friend FREX: homework, study, teach, read, teacher, check, sing
Migration-work	Highest Prob: eat, use, money, company, time, send, food FREX: shift, give, company, hour, meal, cook, hotel

Notes: The four topics (ex-post labeled by the research team) are generated by an unsupervised STM ($k=4$) following the method of Roberts et al. (2016), which lists the highest probability and FREX words in each topic. For more details, see Roberts et al. (2016).

Notes: The figure above plots the expected topic proportion and 95% confidence interval for each proforma topic, by the subject's migrant treatment status (i.e. those who received a migrancy priming vs. a neutral priming prior to playing economic games). Coefficients greater than zero indicate topics that are more frequently raised by subjects in the migrant treatment, while those less than zero indicate topics that are more frequently raised by subjects in the neutral treatment.

	All sample (1)	Brahmin-Chhetri only (2)	Janajati only (3)
Panel A: Demographic characteristics			
Age	36.35	36.52	36.19
Married	86.6%	86.4%	86.7%
Education: 5th grade or above	94.2%	98.1%	90.2%
Education: 10th grade or above	64.8%	79.2%	50.3%
Score in mathematics test *(out of 10)*	6.75	7.08	6.42
Panel B: During migration			
Number of years abroad	7.14	7.29	6.98
% Worked in GCC	68.9%	71.0%	66.8%
% Worked in Malaysia	27.3%	24.3%	30.4%
Number of Nepali co-workers[†]	18.40	23.34	13.43
% from own ethnic group	45.9%	41.5%	50.2%
Number of Nepali roommates[†]	3.99	3.37	4.61
% from own ethnic group	50.3%	46.7%	53.7%
Panel C: Since returning back			
Years since last returning to Nepal	3.06	2.90	3.23
Member of return migrant associations	4.9%	6.3%	3.5%
Member of a neighborhood committee	38.2%	39.7%	36.7%
Member of a political party	22.0%	26.5%	17.4%
Participated in return migrant programs	15.0%	17.0%	13.0%
Participated in ethnic rallies	32.7%	26.2%	39.2%
Participated in political rallies	40.1%	39.4%	40.8%
Participated in meetings of local government	72.7%	74.4%	70.9%
Voted in Nepali election	78.7%	80.4%	76.9%
Observations	633	317	316

Notes: [†]Based on their last job abroad.

	Ingrp	Mig	Ingrp x Mig	Mean dep. var. (*OutNeut*)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time spent on (*in mins.*):				
Migration priming questions	-0.08	1.55	1.90	20.21
	(1.084)	(1.130)	(1.637)	
Neutral priming questions	0.20	-0.95	0.67	15.04
	(0.883)	(0.850)	(1.319)	
Economic game: DG	0.19	0.11	0.13	3.56
	(0.206)	(0.186)	(0.352)	
Economic game: PGG_NP	-0.28	-0.13	0.5	10.51
	(0.503)	(0.502)	(0.679)	
Economic game: PGG_EP	-0.38	-0.06	0.53	8.83
	(0.362)	(0.378)	(0.519)	
Economic game: PGG_AP	-0.27	0.00	0.20	13.69
	(0.626)	(0.658)	(0.901)	
Survey of demo. charac. + cog. test	0.13	-0.64	0.66	15.76
	(0.700)	(0.687)	(0.929)	
Survey of community participation	0.35	-1.12	-0.14	12.33
	(1.002)	(0.730)	(1.178)	
Total interview time	-0.21	0.14	4.86	102.1
	(3.177)	(3.183)	(4.532)	

Notes: The table reports results from the OLS regression $Y=c+\delta\text{Ingrp}+\theta\text{Mig}+\beta\text{IngrpxMig}+\epsilon$, where Ingrp (Mig) is an indicator variable for whether the subject is matched with someone from the own ethnic group (is in the Migrant treatment). The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significant at the *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% levels.

Figure B1: Correlation between Ethnic Identity of Candidates and Voters

Panel A: All municipalities

Figure B1: Correlation between Ethnic Identity of Candidates and Voters

Panel B: Separately by high and low migration rates

Notes: Each dot in panels A and B represents a municipality. The light (dark) shaded dots in panel B represent municipalities in districts with migration rates that are above (equal or below) the median district-level migration rate in Nepal between 2017 and 2019 (based on the DOFE data). Vote share (in the x-axis) is calculated from the 2017 municipal election data; population share (in the y-axis) is based on the voting-age (18 years or older) population in 2017 (calculated from the 2011 Nepal Census data).

Z Game
Slide 4

२०० रुपैयाँ

यस अवस्थामा, तपाईंले रु २०० पाउनु हुनेछ ।

तपाई

अर्का व्यक्ति

Z Game
Slide 5

तपाईंले रु २०० बाट अर्को व्यक्तिलाई कति पैसा दिने भन्ने निर्णय लिन सक्नुहुन्छ ।

तपाई

अर्का व्यक्ति

Z Game
Slide 6

अर्का व्यक्तिलाई दिइसकेपछि तपाईंसँग बचेको पैसा तपाईंले नै पाउनुहुनेछ ।

तपाई

अर्का व्यक्ति

Z Game

यो परिस्थितिका लागि,

जनजाति
(तामाङ)

तपाईंले **तामाङ** थर भएका व्यक्तिसँग पैसा बाँड्नु हुनेछ।

उक्त व्यक्ति **जनजाति** जातिय समूहमा पर्दछन् ।

back

D_slide2

रु २००   रु २००

तपाई र अर्का ब्यक्तिले रु २०० बाट कपमा कति पैसा हाल्ने भन्ने छुट्टाछुट्टै निर्णय लिन सक्नुहुन्छ

तपाई   अर्का ब्यक्ति

D_slide3

रु २००   रु २००

यदि कसैले कपमा निकै थोरै पैसा हाल्यो भने, उक्त ब्यक्तिले घर लैजाने पैसा रु ५० ले घट्नेछ

तपाई   अर्का ब्यक्ति

D_slide4

तपाईको र अर्को व्यक्तिको पैसा घटाउने वा नघटाउने भन्ने निर्णय तेस्रो ब्यक्तिले गरेकाछन, जसले कपमा पैसा हालेका छैनन्

रु २००   रु २००

तेसरो ब्यक्ति

तपाई   अर्का ब्यक्ति

D_slide5

तेस्रो ब्यक्तिले रु २० पाएका छन् । यदि तपाई वा अर्का ब्यक्तिमध्ये एक अथवा दुवै जनाको पैसा रु ५० ले घटाउन चाहेमा, तेस्रो ब्यक्तिले प्रति ब्यक्ति रु १० तिर्नु पर्नेछ ।

रु २००   रु २००

रु २०

तेसरो ब्यक्ति

तपाई   अर्का ब्यक्ति

यो परिस्थितिका लागि,

ब्राह्मण / क्षेत्री (कार्की)

तपाई **कार्की** थर भएका व्यक्तिसँग खेल्नु हुनेछ।
उक्त व्यक्ति **ब्राह्मण / क्षेत्री** जातिय समूहमा पर्दछन् ।

जनजाति
(तामाङ)   ब्राह्मण / क्षेत्री
(के सि)

तपाईको पैसा घटाउने वा नघटाउने भन्ने निर्णय तेस्रो व्यक्तिले गरेका छन्, जसले कपमा पैसा हालेका छैनन्। यि तेस्रो व्यक्ति कि

जनजाति जातिय समूहका **तामाङ** थर भएका व्यक्ति

वा

ब्राह्मण / क्षेत्री जातिय समूहका **के सि** थर भएका व्यक्ति

मध्ये एक हुन सक्छन् ।

back

Example 1

200 NPR

200 NPR

You

Other person

Example 1

200 NPR

200 NPR

You put nothing into the cup

The other person put nothing into the cup

You

Other person

Example 2

0 NPR   **0 NPR**

You put 200 NPR into   The other person put
the cup   200 NPR into the cup

You   Other person

Example 2

0 NPR

0 NPR

200 NPR

You

Other person

Example 2

0 NPR

0 NPR

300 NPR

300 NPR

You

Other person

Example 2

0 NPR+ **300 NPR** = NPR 300

0 NPR + **300 NPR** = 300 NPR

You

Other person

Example 3

0 NPR

200 NPR

You put 200 NPR into the cup

The other person put nothing into the cup

You

Other person

Example 3

Example 3

Example 3

0 NPR + **150 NPR** = 150 NPR

200 NPR + **150 NPR** = **350 NPR**

You

Other person